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The Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the
Endangered Species Act
Shi-Ling Hsu
Editors' Summary: The ESA is simultaneously the most popular and most hated of environmental statutes.
Conservationists fervently support the ESA's mission of preventing the extinction of our country's fish, wildlife, and
plants, but private landowners subject to ESA restrictions claim that the Act unfairly and illogically restricts the use of
their valuable property. As the agency with primary responsibility for the ESA's administration, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) is caught between both sides. This Article examines how the FWS uses habitat conservation
plans (HCPs) to balance the demands of conservationists and property owners. The Article begins by discussing the
divide between conservationists and property owners. It then describes how the Republican majority in Congress, the
judicial trend in takings jurisprudence, and the ESA enforcement difficulties faced by the FWS have led to the
increased use of HCPs. The Article next examines the appeal, effectiveness, advantages, and disadvantages of HCPs.
The Article then explains how the trend in takings jurisprudence jeopardizes the continued legality and use of HCPs.
Last, the Article concludes that the FWS should push for an ESA reauthorization bill that includes certain benefits for
landowners as incentives for conservation. Without such a bill, the Article argues that the HCP process will be subject
to political whimsy and judicial attack.
Shi-Ling Hsu is a Senior Attorney and Economist at the Environmental Law Institute. Mr. Hsu is a graduate of
Columbia Law School, and he received his Ph.D. in Agricultural and Resources Economics from the University of
California at Davis. Mr. Hsu was an Associate at Fenwick & West in Palo Alto, California, from 1987 to 1989 and at
Folger, Levin & Kahn in San Francisco, California, from 1989 to 1990. He was also a Deputy City Attorney for the
city and county of San Francisco from 1990 to 1992. The author would like to thank Jim McElfish, Glenn Sugameli,
Rick Gooch, Dennis Mackey, Cynthia Dohner, Sybil Vosler, Scott Spaulding, Michael Bean, Russ Henly, and Marca
Weinberg for their assistance with this Article.
[29 ELR 10592]
The controversy surrounding the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 19731 always seems to bring out the most
vociferous of critics and supporters of the Act. The debates on the ESA have often been quite ugly, and the public
protests and counter-protests have often been violent. Like a referee in a professional wrestling match, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS), the agency with primary responsibility for the administration of the Act,2 has found itself
trying its hapless best to keep the opposing sides from running amok with righteousness. In struggling to find a middle
ground, the FWS has happily rediscovered the regulatory tool of habitat conservation planning, a statutory means by
which a compromise is struck between landowners subject to potential ESA restrictions and the FWS, as guardian of
endangered species. The FWS has now reached agreement with landowners on hundreds of deals allowing some
destruction of habitat for species that are protected by the Act, in exchange for some promise on the part of the
landowner to otherwise manage their property for the benefit of endangered species.
Virtually every federal environmental law in the United States has faced some form of opposition, but the ESA seems
to have garnered more than its share of enemies. While opposition to other environmental laws, such as the Clean Air
Act (CAA),3 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),4 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act,5 has been at times—and continue to be—bitter and vocal, the general aims of these
laws still enjoy broad public support. Historically, the political and legal battles over these laws seem to pit public
health and safety against industrial interests, with the result being that supporters of these laws have seized the upper
hand in terms of public opinion. There are signs, however, that trouble lies ahead as some of these laws threaten to
inconvenience a broader population. The true tests of these laws probably lie ahead as broader and more powerful
interests are affected.6
[29 ELR 10593]
The ESA, on the other hand, has always lived on the edge. From the beginning, there was a perception that saving
species meant losing jobs in the timber industry,7 forbidding individual landowners to build on their land, and forcing
small ranches and farms to cease operation.8 Opponents of the ESA have adroitly projected this fear onto a much
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broader population by convincing many that the ESA is a threat to that which Americans hold dear: their private
property. The ESA's powerful prohibitions against the "take" of species listed as endangered or threatened do, in fact,
extend to private property9 and even prohibit private landowners from engaging in actions on their property that
adversely modify habitat of listed species.10 The fact that arguments for amending, reforming, or even repealing the
ESA have a grain of truth in them has lent detractors an element of credibility and has generated considerable hostility
toward the ESA. This hostility has manifested itself in political arenas throughout the history of the ESA and has
increased in frequency and intensity of late. It has reached a point such that there is a constant threat of legislative
overhaul of the ESA.
Proponents of the ESA have countered with their own equally powerful moral arguments that appeal to a different
populace and a different ethic. The base of support for the ESA comes from the conservation community, those that
argue for a moral imperative to preserve endangered species. The ESA has served as a beacon for the conservation
community, a line in the sand that environmental organizations have steadfastly defended. In addition, the physical
appeal of certain species protected by the ESA—the bald eagle, California condor, gray wolf, and grizzly bear, to name
just a few of the "charismatic megafauna"11—have proven to be a powerful lever for public opinion. For ESA
proponents, strategies of drawing upon the inclination of people to protect attractive animals and warning people of the
legacy that they leave behind for future generations have proven to be surprisingly effective.
In addition to the acrimony and political enmity fueled by vast differences in values, the ESA debate has also been
driven by the ambiguity of takings jurisprudence. While few lawsuits have been filed that raise the claim that ESA
restrictions work an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation,12 the U.S. Supreme Court
has muddled the relationship between land use regulation and constitutional protections of private property. The ESA
has been a casualty of this ambiguity in that the FWS has operated under a chilling threat of a takings lawsuit.13 The
problem is that the ESA straddles a distinction between regulations that prevent harm and regulations that confer
benefits, the former being a legitimate exercise of the police power, and the latter being a constitutionally suspect
attempt to extract benefits from a tyrannized few for a tyrannizing majority. While this distinction no longer has any
legal significance,14 it still seems to have much influence in the court of public opinion and even among many
commentators unacquainted with the nuances of takings jurisprudence.15 Another reason that the CAA and the
FWPCA enjoy public support is that regulating the pollution of water and air seem to be harm-preventing exercises,
but it is less clear whether regulations protecting biological diversity are harm-preventing or benefit-conferring. This
has further polarized Americans with respect to the ESA.
The combination of the vituperative nature of the public debate and the constant threats of judicial and legislative
challenges has sent the FWS scurrying for cover. Seeking not only to broker some peace between the warring sides, but
also sensing that their regulatory authority was in the gunsights of ESA opponents, the FWS sought to extend
landowners an olive branch. The FWS has thus resurrected the regulatory tool of habitat conservation planning,
whereby the FWS will permit ESA violations in exchange for an agreement by a landowner to undertake mitigation
measures that might not otherwise be required by law.
The Legal and Political Context
The ESA prohibits the "take" of any species listed as threatened or endangered by the FWS. The "take" of a species is
defined to include not only the direct killing or capturing of [29 ELR 10594] listed species, but also a wide variety of
actions that adversely affect listed species, such as harassment,16 pursuit,17 and the alteration of habitat.18 Moreover, as
mentioned above, this prohibition applies to uses of private property. Therefore, private landowners may well find
themselves unable to exploit their property as they see fit if their actions can be seen as an adverse alteration of habitat
of a listed species.19 This application of the term "take" has spurred the most controversy surrounding the ESA because
it highlights a property rights conflict between the rights of private landowners and the general rights of society, as
expressed through the ESA, to biological resources and ecological integrity. It is hard to overstate the magnitude of this
conflict because more than one-half of all endangered and threatened species have at least 81 percent of their habitat on
private lands.20
Enter habitat conservation plans (HCPs). The FWS may issue a landowner a permit to "incidentally take" endangered
or threatened species if the landowner submits and agrees to abide by an FWS-approved HCP, which is a long-term
plan of mitigation measures aimed at conserving habitat and aiding endangered and threatened species. The take of
listed species must be "incidental to, and not the purpose of" an otherwise lawful activity.21 HCPs are an extra layer of
regulation not intended to supersede any other state or local regulations. For example, before logging activities can take
place in the old growth forested habitat of the threatened northern spotted owl, not only must an HCP be in place, but
all other forestry permits required under state law must be obtained. Further, the HCP must not "appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild."22 HCPs represent a form of a regulatory compromise
or, perhaps, pretrial settlement if one views litigation in the broader sense where possibly disastrous precedent could be
set in ESA case law. HCPs allow landowners to realize some fraction of their development plans so that they can still
garner private profits while allowing the FWS to implement some conservation measures where it might not otherwise
be able. In addition, both parties avoid litigation costs, and both parties gain a measure of certainty that may be
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precious if they are at all risk-averse.
The HCP concept stemmed from an early ESA conflict involving the rare mission blue butterfly's only habitat, which is
located in the San Bruno hills south of San Francisco.23 Potential ESA restrictions had jeopardized plans to develop
private property within the butterfly's habitat, and local environmental groups had threatened to use the ESA's citizen
suit provision to derail development plans. After seeking out local environmental groups and local governments
interested in the development plans, the developer initiated and obtained a negotiated agreement regarding habitat
preservation for the mission blue butterfly. The FWS, which also participated in the negotiations, gave the agreement
its blessing and sought to amend the ESA to legitimize these types of negotiated solutions. The mission blue butterfly
plan thus became the first HCP formally recognized under the ESA with the passage of 1982 amendments to the
ESA.24
The duration of HCPs have varied. Individual landowners desiring to construct a single-family home on their lot are
often issued permits lasting five years, which is sufficient time for them to construct their house. Logging companies,
on the other hand, that plan their harvests over long periods of time sometimes have HCPs lasting 100 years.25 HCPs
drew only modest interest in their earlier years, but experienced a dramatic upsurge in interest in 1994. From 1982 to
1989, only three HCPs were approved and only three incidental take permits were issued. From 1990 to 1993, 22 HCPs
were approved, but from 1994 to 1997, the number of HCPs skyrocketed to 193. As of January 31, 1998, the FWS had
approved 230 HCPs. The upsurge in interest in HCPs has strained the FWS' resources, but citing a desire to engage in
long-term, comprehensive, ecosystem-level planning,26 the FWS has embraced the HCP process.27 Affected
landowners have also expressed enthusiasm for the HCP process, especially the increased regulatory certainty
associated with HCPs.28
While these positive-spin reasons for the upsurge in interest in HCPs are important, there are also other reasons. The
increased popularity of HCPs coincided with the election of the 104th Congress, the first Congress since 1954 in which
both the House and the Senate were governed by a Republican majority. The wave of reform-minded freshman
Republicans adopted as part of their "Contract With America" legislative agenda a number of initiatives aimed at
curbing federal regulatory powers, including takings legislation. Disappointed with the Supreme Court's reluctance to
move takings jurisprudence quickly, property rights advocates proposed, and the Republican majority championed,
takings [29 ELR 10595] legislation that would require federal regulatory agencies to compensate landowners if a
federal regulation resulted in a diminution of property value that exceeded a threshold amount.29 Of course, requiring
regulatory agencies to pay compensation for their regulatory actions would effectively terminate many regulatory
programs, including the ESA, an outcome clearly envisioned by property rights advocates.
Some members of the 104th Congress also targeted the ESA specifically for legislative reform. A congressional
Endangered Species Task Force was convened in order to hold a series of hearings throughout the country where input
from landowners on possible ESA reforms could be solicited. These contrived hearings typically resembled a rally
where most speakers expressed their bitter opposition to the ESA.30 Rep. Richard Pombo (R-Cal.), who chaired many
of the hearings, was unapologetic about orchestrating the one-sided proceedings. In fact, Representative Pombo told
reporters that the debate had been "stacked" the other way for years and that it was "their turn."31 Meanwhile, back in
Congress, the ESA was blamed for the downturn of the logging industry, the resulting psychological trauma
experienced by timber industry workers, and even for child and spousal abuse in logging communities.32 Along with a
flurry of other proposed laws reforming the ESA,33 Representative Pombo cosponsored legislation to do away with
most of the ESA's mandatory provisions, limit the definition of "take" to the actual physical injuring of a species, limit
the use of the citizen suit provision, and require the FWS to compensate landowners if any regulatory action resulted in
any diminution of property value.34 Even legislation proposed by congressional supporters of the ESA contained some
provisions that ESA opponents championed, such as a peer review process for any new listing decisions,35 and tax
breaks for landowners entering into conservation agreements with the FWS.36 Although none of the ESA reform bills
reached the floor of the House, some did pass the House Resources Committee,37 the mere fact of which was evidence
enough that the ESA and the FWS were under fire. More tangibly, in 1995, Congress imposed a six-month moratorium
on the listing of new species and the designation of new critical habitat.38 Rather than directly forbidding the FWS
from making any new listings or designations, the moratorium prohibited the FWS from using any of the appropriated
funds for new listings or new critical habitat designations. Significantly, this was a strong signal that the Republican
Congress might actually carry through with its threats to weaken the ESA, if only indirectly, but perhaps more
effectively, by reducing FWS funding.
The upsurge in HCPs can also be explained by an increasing threat of unfavorable precedent being set in takings
jurisprudence. While takings law has not yet made its indelible mark on the ESA, the threat seems real enough. Part of
the impetus that induced the FWS to agree to purchase a 3,000-acre tract of old growth forest in northern California
was the fact that the owner of the tract had filed a lawsuit in the Court of Federal Claims claiming that proposed ESA
restrictions would amount to a regulatory taking in contravention of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The
deal, which involved the payment of $ 486 million of state and federal money to a landowner with a reputation for poor
environmental behavior, was roundly criticized by environmental organizations.39 However, the fact that the FWS was
willing to engage in the effort to acquire the tract seems evidence enough of the threat posed by the lawsuit, which the
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landowner voluntarily dismissed as a condition of the purchase.
[29 ELR 10596]
With such hostility toward the ESA, it should perhaps be no surprise that the Act has a debilitating enforcement
problem. When landowners become aware of the possible listing of a species that may affect their property, they
sometimes preempt ESA restrictions by degrading their property so that it ceases to be a habitat. Numerous reports of
"midnight bulldozing" just prior to the listing of the California coastal gnatcatcher indicated that developers were
reacting to the possibility of land use restrictions interfering with their development plans.40 Some landowners simply
kill the species just before it is listed. For example, prior to the listing of the San Diego mesa mint, one of the plant's
three remaining populations was destroyed by a developer in order to avoid ESA restrictions.41 In other instances, even
if ESA restrictions are in place, landowners will intentionally kill listed species they find on their property in the wellfounded belief that the FWS will never learn of the presence of the species or of the illegal act of killing them. Grizzly
bears have been deliberately and quietly killed by ranchers fearful of losing their livestock to predation.42 Perhaps more
than any other case, this has given rise to the phrase "shoot, shovel, and shut up." The extent to which such preemptive
and sometimes illegal activity takes place is difficult to determine because the evidence is anecdotal in nature,43 but the
abundance of such stories suggests that its occurrence is probably not unusual. Part of the problem is the political will
on the part of the FWS to actually carry out the ESA's enforcement provisions. As recently as May 1998, a retired
Arizona postal worker on a camping trip shot and killed one of a pair of endangered Mexican gray wolves that had
been reintroduced at considerable taxpayer expense in a National Wildlife Refuge area. The only defense to the killing
of an endangered species is self-defense, and protection of one's property is not a defense.44 Although the
circumstances strongly suggested that the wolf posed no threat at all to the man or his dogs, the FWS declined to
prosecute the man.45
Another aspect to the FWS' enforcement problem is simply a lack of resources. Congress has traditionally refused to
allocate the FWS sufficient funds to carry out a reasonable enforcement program.46 Thus, political will or not, the FWS
has usually operated from a substantial disadvantage when attempting to deal with lawless landowners.
The Response by the FWS
With all the political hostility to the ESA, the threat of an unfavorable legal precedent, and the obstacles to
enforcement, the FWS was in desperate need of engaging landowners in some form of voluntary compliance. It needed
to do this not only to establish some positive relationship with landowners, but also to show the broader public that the
ESA could be landowner friendly. Public relations had become a high priority for the FWS, and with HCPs, the FWS
could make substantial overtures toward landowners. The FWS clearly welcomed a situation where they could
"bargain in the shadow of the law,"47 rather than take their chances with the legislative or judicial branches.
The FWS manifested its commitment to HCPs not only by processing significantly more HCPs than they ever had in
the past, but also by further sweetening the deal for landowners. In August 1994, the FWS introduced the "No
Surprises" policy. Under the No Surprises policy, the FWS may grant an assurance that if a permittee fully complies
with the terms of an HCP that adequately covers a species, the FWS will not require the permittee to undertake any
further mitigation measures deemed necessary in the future.48 Further mitigation measures may be deemed necessary in
the future if it is determined that a species' habitat needs are greater than previously thought, if previously absent listed
species migrate onto the landowner's property, or if species not currently listed become listed and trigger a series of
habitat protection regulations. A landowner with an HCP but without a No Surprises assurance may face additional
regulations under those circumstances. A No Surprises assurance guarantees that the landowner's liability to undertake
mitigation measures is limited to those set forth in the HCP. A No Surprises assurance will typically require the
landowner to undertake additional mitigation measures in the short term, but landowners have not been hesitant to
seize a guarantee that barring the occurrence of extraordinary circumstances, the HCP represents an exhaustive list of
obligations with respect to the species covered by the HCP.
One question, however, remains. Have HCPs been an effective tool for addressing these problems?
Criticisms and Praises of HCPs
The criticisms of the HCP process are many. The most fundamental criticism is that HCPs allow the FWS to cede too
much in the way of concessions to developers and loggers. The FWS has not used HCPs to aid in the recovery of listed
species and has apparently settled for the more modest goal of only making sure that HCPs do not appreciably reduce
the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species in the wild.49 In general, the FWS is criticized for implementing
HCPs too generously by conceding to landowners far more than necessary in order to obtain their assent to an HCP.
The evidence to support this assertion can be found in HCPs that seem to allow landowners to develop or log their
property in substantially the same manner that they would in the absence of any ESA restrictions. Some HCPs for
condominium construction in the beach dune habitat of the Alabama [29 ELR 10597] beach mouse require only that
the condominiums be constructed north of the beachfront dune line, which is already required by state law.50 In fact,
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the FWS was successfully sued by a Sierra Club chapter for the issuance of incidental take permits for the Alabama
beach mouse without a sufficient scientific basis for determining that there would be "no significant impact."51 Many
HCPs for timber harvesting in the habitat of the Red Hills salamander only prohibit logging on land that the
salamander is likely to occupy, which is land that is too steep to log anyway.52 Several HCPs for logging in the habitat
of the red-cockaded woodpecker simply require that the permittee help to establish colonies of redcockaded
woodpeckers by transporting woodpeckers to off-site locations where nesting cavities are drilled. One of the more
shocking examples involves the Red Oak Timber Company of Louisiana, which purchased a 1,000-acre tract of forest
land that provided habitat to two groups of redcockaded woodpeckers. After Red Oak logged all but the 137 acres of
the land inhabited by the woodpeckers, it sought an incidental take permit to log the remaining acreage. Red Oak
proposed an HCP that would relocate the woodpeckers to a nearby military base that had existing red-cockaded
woodpecker habitat where artificial nesting cavities for the woodpeckers would be drilled. The total cost of these
mitigation measures was $ 8,800, approximately the amount of proceeds from the timber from five or six acres of the
property. The FWS agreed.53
It is premature to conclude, however, that this is simply a matter of the FWS giving away the store. Given the resources
it has to work with, the FWS may simply be making the best of a bad situation.54 The FWS has shown more vigor in
negotiations involving land that is more ecologically valuable. In cases where the quality of the habitat is poor, the
FWS will strike a more generous bargain with the landowner than it will when the habitat is of high quality. For
example, the FWS has been more willing to permit development in the portions of Alabama beach mouse habitat that
has been heavily developed than in those portions where the habitat is rich and important.55
Some environmental organizations disenchanted with HCPs have suggested that the FWS has been "captured" by those
interests that it is charged with regulating, namely developers and loggers. Political theorists argued several years ago
that the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service seemed to be allying themselves with regulated
parties rather than serving a broader public interest.56 According to this theory, because federal officials at the local
level interact with local regulated parties more often than anybody else, they are more likely to be swayed by their
influence than by the influence of their superiors in Washington. Thus, the livestock, mining, and forest product
industries appeared to wield undue influence in pushing these agencies toward managing for extractive uses of federal
land. There is no evidence that the FWS has been captured, although cases such as the Red Oak Timber HCP are cause
for some alarm.
The critical question is: what does the FWS consider to be its baseline from which it is negotiating? Since very few
HCPs interfere substantially with development or logging plans, one could probably conclude that the FWS considers
its bargaining position to be weak. Is this justified? At this point, the answer can only be based on anecdotal evidence.
The case for the FWS being more aggressive in negotiations can be made by the Southwest Center for Biodiversity, a
small Tucson, Arizona, environmental organization. Since 1993, the Southwest Center has sued federal agencies 113
times (mostly over ESA issues), and 79 percent of the time it has forced the agency to undertake the sought-after
administrative action, such as the listing of a species or designation of critical habitat.57 With its meager budget,
modest public relations efforts, and its opposition to powerful development interests, the Southwest Center certainly
suffers from a number of disadvantages—at least as many as the FWS. Yet the fact that it has obtained a successful
outcome 79 percent of the time suggests that the FWS may be overestimating the legal dangers of taking a more
adversarial position. It would certainly seem that the Southwest Center is providing some significant legal cover for the
FWS should it [29 ELR 10598] be interested in negotiating more aggressively. Litigation by environmental
organizations opposing HCPs have heretofore been rare,58 but if the FWS continues to spend the majority of their time
negotiating with potential permittees than with environmental organizations, past inaction by environmental groups
will not likely continue.
A second fundamental criticism of the HCP process pertains to the very long-term commitments that are being made
by the FWS. While it is true that logging companies in particular need to plan for time horizons on the order of 100
years, it is also true that much can happen in 100 years. Wetlands were not even considered ecologically valuable until
several decades ago. What might the FWS be agreeing to give away that will be deemed highly valuable 50 years from
now? This is an especially compelling question in forest HCPs, where the complexity of the ecosystem interactions are
still only beginning to be understood. Thus, there is a good reason that forest HCPs are the only class of HCPs for
which "No Surprises" assurances are not automatically attached to the HCP as a matter of FWS policy.
A third criticism of HCPs is that it has curbed citizen participation in the ESA. Citizen participation has been perhaps
most beneficial in the case of the ESA because many listings of endangered or threatened species have been made
pursuant to citizen petitions. Prof. Holly Doremus of the University of California Davis School of Law points out three
ways in which citizens are effectively shut out of the HCP process: (1) the early negotiations of HCPs take place
between the FWS and the landowner, with no public input; (2) too little information is provided to the public too late in
the process; and (3) citizen suits are effectively undermined by the issuance of an incidental take permit that eliminates
the possibility that a landowner is operating in violation of the ESA.59 This is a discouraging problem, especially
because the high percentage success rate of the Southwest Center for Biodiversity suggests that there are many holes in
ESA administration that are being left open by the FWS.
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A final criticism of HCPs is that the precedent set by the HCP process poses some gaming problems for federal
regulators in general. The success regulated parties have had in forcing the FWS to the bargaining table by threatening
to sue or lobby for legislative reform and by shooting, shoveling, and shutting up invites further intimidation. While we
may hope that our regulatory agencies can persist in representing broader interests, in many cases they will not.
Moreover, the mere threat of litigation or legislative attack, even if unmeritorious, imposes costs upon agencies that
must evaluate the seriousness of each attack. The resources required to put out such fires would almost certainly be
better spent carrying out its regulatory duties.
Not all the news is bad for HCPs. The HCP program has also attracted many advocates, the most prominent of which is
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt. Secretary Babbitt has long sought to avoid thelogjam created by the litigation
and political conflict over logging in the Pacific Northwest habitat of the northern spotted owl, which he characterized
as a "national train wreck."60 HCPs represented such an opportunity. They are a mechanism for the FWS and
landowners to avoid litigation and its attendant costs, both in terms of resources spent and the uncertainty introduced
into the regulatory process. Litigation is particularly ominous if, as is often the case in the ESA, the only possible
outcomes for a parcel of private property are: (1) the FWS regulates the property, and (2) the FWS doesn't regulate the
property. The most efficient outcome is likely to be one in which there is some development or logging and some
preservation because it is a rare case where complete development or logging or complete preservation are the most
desirable outcomes from a societal standpoint. Thus, HCPs allow the FWS and landowners to escape from a binary
world where either the FWS or the landowner is a winner, and the other is a loser.
HCPs also offer the opportunity to perform planning on a regional or ecosystem level. California's Natural Community
Conservation Program (NCCP), which is also meant to facilitate planning on a regional level, offered the Secretary a
model that could be coopted into the HCP mechanism. Indeed, the pilot NCCP programs in the San Diego area and in
Orange County, California, are hailed as examples of how comprehensive planning can be done at the regional level
and with the input of developers, environmental organizations, community groups, and local, state, and federal
government.61 Ideally, planning on a regional or ecosystem level for multiple affected species and with multiple stakeholders participating in the process allows for broader and more comprehensive ecological considerations and helps to
avoid litigation, providing more certainty for all parties. A broader planning scale also allows for the identification of
the best areas for development and the best areas for conservation. In addition, such comprehensive plans, if done well,
can effectively delegate significant authority to local governments to carry out some of the more ministerial aspects of
habitat management.62 The city of Austin, Texas, and the county of Travis, Texas,—where Austin is located—are
authorized to issue permits for development in certain areas of golden-cheeked warbler habitat, provided that certain
mitigation measures are agreed to by the landowners, many of whom are individuals seeking to construct single-family
homes on a single lot. The city of Austin and Travis County must also contribute to the acquisition of some prime
golden-cheeked warbler habitat in an area known as the Balcones Canyonlands. Multiple species and regional HCPs
are also being developed in Las Vegas, Nevada; St. George, Utah; and Western Riverside County, California.
Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of HCPs is that they allow the FWS to make the best of a bad situation.
Apart from the unfortunate need to mollify its political enemies, the FWS must solve its "shoot, shovel, and shut up"
problem. There are two aspects to the problem: one regarding illegal behavior and one regarding legal behavior, but
both can be addressed by HCPs. With respect to the problem of deterring the illegal killing of species, HCPs serve as a
means of ameliorating the FWS' enforcement problem. If the FWS cannot compel lawful observance of [29 ELR
10599] the ESA, perhaps it can induce landowners to agree to it. This seems an unfortunate necessary evil, but given
the resources of the FWS, it may be necessary.
The other aspect of the FWS' "shoot, shovel, and shut up" problem is how to counter the incentives for legal behavior
detrimental to imperiled species, such as the midnight bull-dozing that occurred prior to the listing of the California
coastal gnatcatcher. HCPs by themselves cannot provide positive incentives to aid imperiled species that completely
balance the negative incentives to harm imperiled species in the interests of avoiding ESA restrictions. However, the
willingness of the FWS to negotiate HCPs tempers the possible downsides of managing private property in a speciesfriendly manner. HCPs also allow the FWS a means by which they can specify affirmative duties for the landowner
where such duties could not be otherwise compelled. Ensuring that longleaf pine forests remain habitable for the redcockaded woodpecker requires several affirmative management measures, including prescribed burning and thinning
and hardwood tree control. The threat by a North Carolina landowner to cease to manage his timberlands in such a
fashion was part of the impetus for the FWS seeking out an HCP with the landowner.63 In addition, the FWS has
incorporated into the HCP process the "Safe Harbor" policy, which protects landowners from future ESA regulation if
they initially practice land management in such a way that is beneficial to listed species. This policy grew out of
similar concerns of landowners that if their forest management practices were too beneficial to the red-cockaded
woodpecker, their property would be colonized by woodpeckers and thereafter subject to ESA restrictions.64 In
response to these landowners' concerns, the FWS proposed a special rule whereby the enhancement, restoration, or
maintenance of habitat conducive to colonization or habitation of endangered or threatened species would insulate the
landowner from future ESA restrictions, provided that if the landowner later abandoned species-friendly land
management, the FWS would be afforded an opportunity to relocate the species.65

The Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under th...

A final advantage of HCPs is that the FWS can obtain access to private property to gather much-needed information
about endangered or threatened species. In the course of monitoring the population and the habits of the Alabama
beach mouse, the FWS learned that the beach mouse utilized much more than the beach dunes previously thought to be
its sole habitat. From the information gathered in these monitoring efforts, the FWS adjusted its HCP negotiating
policy so that the HCPs also contained some measure of protection for the scrub dunes landward of the beach dunes.66
Again, with more than one-half of all endangered and threatened species having at least 81 percent of their habitat on
private lands, the FWS cannot allow itself to be shut out of private lands if it is to advance its knowledge of these
species.
The Specter of Nollan and Dolan
Yet another threat looms for the FWS, and it may even affect the viability of the HCP program. Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence may be moving at a pace disappointing to property rights advocates, but it has certainly not moved in a
direction unfavorable to landowners. While the legal landscape is littered with takings cases that cloud the status of
private property rights, two cases in particular, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission67 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,68 may pose problems for HCPs. These cases diverge from a substantial body of case law that has afforded
regulatory agencies broad power to place conditions on the permitting of land use activities and imposed new tests
upon the legitimacy of such conditions.69 Taken together, the cases require that any condition of a governmental
issuance of a permit must bear a nexus with the underlying regulation or law that would authorize outright denial of the
permit, and the condition must impose a burden on the landowner that is roughly proportional to the benefits conferred
by the imposition of the condition. Since HCPs invariably contain a number of mitigation measures that could be
considered conditions, these two cases pose threats to the authority of the FWS to negotiate HCPs at all.
The nexus requirement is a threat to HCPs because it is highly unclear whether a particular mitigation measure
required by the FWS will be deemed by a court to be sufficiently related to the underlying statute, the ESA. For
example, the FWS has often required the payment of money so it can acquire habitat to compensate for the loss of
habitat on the property covered by the HCP. In the case of more than 40 HCPs for construction of single-family homes
in the habitat of the golden-cheeked warbler, the payment of $ 1,500 or $ 2,000 is virtually the only thing that the FWS
demanded of the landowner. The reason is sound enough—the FWS seeks to purchase prime golden-cheeked warbler
habitat elsewhere. But does this invite the Supreme Court to ask whether such a payment scheme is only an "exercise
in cleverness and imagination"?70 Money, after all, can be spent on anything. If unfavorable market conditions caused
the FWS to be slightly remiss in acquiring mitigating property, courts will find that requirement of the payment of
money to be a mere sham and lacking nexus to the preservation of endangered or threatened species.
The nexus requirement also poses problems for comprehensive, multi-species HCPs that provide mitigation measures
for species not yet present on the property or not yet listed under the ESA. HCPs for timber harvest and management in
the habitat of the northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet sometimes involve hundreds of species other than the
owl and the murrelet.71 Does the possibility of a future migration onto the property or the possibility of a future listing
provide a sufficient nexus to the ESA? It is hard to say. The problem is that little is known about the habits of many
species. It would simply be impossible to say if a particular [29 ELR 10600] mitigation measure has any nexus to the
goal of preserving species. Interestingly, it is typically the landowner that seeks to include more species in the HCP,
rather than the FWS. It is apparently landowners that have more to gain from the inclusion of many species in an HCP.
The nexus requirement also threatens HCPs that are aimed at study of imperiled species, such as adaptive
management.72
Dolan's "rough proportionality" requirement may be even more disturbing. In addition to requiring that the condition
impose a burden on the landowner that is roughly proportional to the benefits conferred, Dolan requires that "some sort
of individualized determination" be made regarding the burdens and benefits of the conditions.73 While the recent
Supreme Court decision in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.74 makes a point of confining the
rough proportionality test to "excessive exactions" rather than outright denials of development, it has left unclear the
scope of excessive exactions.75 Particularly troubling is the Supreme Court's remand of Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,76
the day after Dolan was decided, "for further consideration in light of" Dolan, and granting leave to the Pacific Legal
Foundation, a property rights advocacy group, to file an amicus brief. The Ehrlich case involved the imposition of a
development fee as a condition of approval of development, a condition commonly used in HCPs. Will such conditions
undo HCPs, or does applicability of Dolan turn on whether the landowner is deprived of the right to exclude others
from using the land for a public use?77 If that is the case, then the crucial advantage of HCPs allowing the FWS access
to the property for biological study purposes may be eliminated.
Assuming that the rough proportionality test applies to HCPs, the critical question becomes: who is to say whether the
burden imposed by a mitigation measure upon a landowner is roughly proportional to the benefits conferred? This is a
question that even the FWS has trouble answering, and to allow the courts to second-guess the FWS is to invite
trouble. HCPs for the Florida scrub jay are, for the most part, highly similar. Of the three remaining populations of the
Florida scrub jay, one is broken down into a subpopulation existing on a barrier island and a subpopulation existing on
an area on the mainland known as the Valkaria Preserve. Development pressure on the barrier island is intense, with
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vacant lots ranging in value from $ 30,000 to $ 60,000 per acre. This stands in contrast to the mainland, where vacant
lots range in value from $ 4,000 to $ 7,000 per acre. The FWS has used this price differential to strike a compromise
with developers seeking to build homes, condominiums, and resorts on the barrier island. In exchange for every acre of
Florida scrub jay habitat lost to development, a developer must acquire two acres of Florida scrub jay habitat to
augment the Valkaria Preserve. The FWS has thus made the decision to allow the barrier island to fall to the absolute
minimum level necessary for that subpopulation to sustain itself—19 families78—while focusing its recovery efforts on
the mainland subpopulation by augmenting the Valkaria Preserve. Developers have found this exchange acceptable
because their barrier island land is much more valuable than the mainland properties they are being asked to acquire,
and the FWS seems to have made peace with pinning its recovery hopes on the mainland scrub jay subpopulation.
Whether or not one believes that the FWS is doing a good enough job of negotiating, this arrangement, where valuable
habitat and low-quality development land is exchanged for valuable development land and low-quality habitat, is the
type of compromise that HCPs are most suitable for producing, and both sides improve their lot in the process. Yet who
is to say that the two-for-one mitigation ration meets the rough proportionality test? Under the Dolan formulation, the
burdens imposed by the mitigation condition—$ 4,000 to $ 7,000 per acre—must be roughly equivalent to the benefits
conferred—the increased chances of survival for the mainland subpopulation produced by two additional acres of
preserve. It is hard to imagine a judicial body undertaking such an inquiry, yet that is what the rough proportionality
requirement would apparently call for.
There are other examples of mitigation measures that have the potential of running afoul of the rough proportionality
test. As mentioned above, HCPs in the forested habitat of the northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet are
particularly complex. Most of the mitigation measures require the landowner to leave valuable trees standing. Suppose
the burden imposed upon the landowner is measured in the foregone revenues of harvesting those trees. What is the
significance of the fact that timber revenues vary substantially over time? Can a mitigation measure be roughly
proportional to the habitat-providing benefits of preserving trees one year and not the next? Over 100 years, the answer
to this question could very well be different.
Fundamentally, the problem is that little is known about many imperiled species. In the absence of such information,
neither the nexus requirement nor the roughly proportional requirement can have any meaning.
Conclusion
While Prof. J.B. Ruhl79 asserts that the FWS was acting more proactively than defensively in ushering in the advent of
HCPs, this initiative would not have occurred but for the FWS' enforcement problems and their political and legal
problems. The FWS has long known that saving imperiled species requires the conservation of habitat on private
property. What the Republican Revolution of 1994 highlighted [29 ELR 10601] was the political need to compromise
in order to achieve some conservation measures on private lands. The Clinton Administration has clearly trumped
property rights advocates on this issue by moving forward with a policy measure that meets with the approval of many
landowners that face ESA restrictions.
But has the HCP initiative advanced the goals of the ESA? Prof. Karin Sheldon of Vermont Law School has argued
that there is a continuing mismatch between the ESA's emphasis on individual species and the need to conduct habitat
conservation planning on a geographic basis, with the result that HCPs are still awkward compromises that rarely
contribute to a species' recovery. Professor Sheldon is also one of a number of commentators that has noted the
apparent lenience with which the FWS has required mitigation measures in HCPs. While the FWS is not being
consistently swindled by landowners, it would certainly appear that the FWS could stand to ask more of landowners for
the valuable certainty of conducting operations free of worry over ESA violations. The preliminary litigation success
by environmental organizations should provide some legal cover for the FWS and seems to indicate that the FWS
would generally have the law on their side had they the political will to negotiate more aggressively. What the FWS
probably fears is that if they did take a more aggressive position, the law would be changed in the form of dramatic
ESA reform.
Granted, it is much easier to advise the FWS to drive a harder bargain than it is for them to actually do it. While the
immediate risks posed by the 104th Congress have passed, many Republicans who were newcomers in 1994 are still in
office, and Rep. Don Young (R-Alaska), who has made a political career from lambasting the ESA, is still the chair of
the House Resources Committee. Moreover, an important reason that Representatives Young and Pombo failed in their
efforts to bring about major ESA reform is because of the refusal of then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.)
to allow their versions of ESA to be brought before the full House of Representatives.80 No such obstacle exists in the
current House. In this political climate, the FWS' best bet is to push for a reauthorization bill that is acceptable to
enough Republicans to pass both houses. This may involve inclusion of certain benefits, such as tax incentives, for
landowners that manage their land for habitat, and other mechanisms designed to remove perverse incentives to
degrade habitat, such as Safe Harbor assurances, but this would also require that Congress abandon its traditional
strategy of trying to choke the ESA to death by under-funding the FWS.
Congress' historical stinginess with respect to funding for ESA programs must be reversed. Opponents of the ESA had
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hoped to break the will of conservationists and the FWS by starving ESA programs, but it has been clear for a long
time that this will not happen. The ESA is simply too important to too many environmental organizations, and too
popular with the general public, for detractors to hope that it will wither away and die. Without adequate funding,
however, the FWS cannot take enforcement actions against scofflaws. What could break the current stalemate is a
combination of appropriations for ESA enforcement and positive incentives such as payments to induce landowners to
act in the interests of imperiled species.
Perhaps little can be done in the short-term about the Nollan and Dolan doctrines. HCPs provide one of the more
glaring examples of the pernicious effects of these cases. The Nollan and Dolan cases not only place undue emphasis
on protecting the landowner, they place constraints upon the ability of both the FWS and the landowners to bargain.
The yoke of the Nollan and Dolan doctrines move the ESA back toward a binary world in which a property is either
regulated or not regulated, and mutual gains from exchange are lost. The best that the FWS can do is to remain vigilant
about stating the biological bases for requiring mitigation measures in HCPs and hope for the best.
In an era where regulatory compromises and voluntary agreements81 seem to be gaining popularity with both regulators
and regulated parties, HCPs represent a compromise in an area of immense conflict. One can argue that the balance
between landowners and the FWS has been struck incorrectly, but it is hard to argue with the HCP initiative's basic
aims of avoiding costly and acrimonious litigation and planning for habitat conservation with more flexibility and more
information. The FWS could do a better job of requiring help from landowners. Ultimately, however, where the HCP
program goes from here may depend much more upon the courts and the legislature.
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